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Executive Summary 
 
It is widely recognised that problems with organisational culture played a major role in the 
financial crisis which crystallised in the late 2000s.  ‘Risk culture’ in particular has become 
an object of focus and discussion by regulators and other bodies, yet there is no 
consensus on exactly what it is or how it might be managed. This research study, funded 
from a mix of public and private sources, seeks to enhance the practical understanding of 
risk culture.  We regard it as highly likely that organisations can be characterised by more 
than one risk culture.  We also propose a ‘bandwidth’ model of risk culture to suggest 
that there is no ideal, and that it can be understood in terms of the formal and informal 
processes by which organisations manage risk taking and control within limits of various 
kinds, including incentivisation limits. This interim report describes our initial findings 
and ideas based on deskwork and in-depth interviews with senior risk staff at nine major 
financial organisations.  Future work will expand the interview base and conduct surveys 
to assess typical ‘stress points’ in organisational risk cultures.  Our findings to date are 
grouped around four main themes. 
• First, in contrast to public debates which emphasise values and the need to 
change mindsets, we learned of risk culture workstreams with more of an 
emphasis on improving oversight structures and information flows, including 
performance metrics for risk and good compliance. 
• Second, from our discussions it also appeared that critical issues in risk culture 
were being played out in the space between what are called first and second lines of 
defence, suggesting that this distinction, which many take for granted, may not be 
helpful in advancing the debate about risk culture. 
• Third, improving risk culture was also seen by CROs as a matter of improving 
the organisational footprint of the risk management function.  This was more than just 
rolling out ERM systems but involved expanding the reach of informal risk 
processes, information sharing and escalation, and representation on key 
committees. 
• Fourth, we also heard concerns about a familiar issue – the role of documentation. 
The argument was that some documentary and evidentiary demands were 
creating the wrong kind of risk culture.  We intend to follow up further on this. 
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1. Risk Culture: background 
Much of the commentary and analysis about the actions of financial organisations, from 
the global financial crisis to events such as product mis-selling, rogue trading and the 
recent LIBOR scandal, share a common and fundamental focus. It is argued that these 
problems arose because of weaknesses in the cultures of banks and other financial 
institutions (BOFIs).  Yet, despite near universal agreement that this problem is at the 
centre of things, relatively little has been done by practitioners, regulators or academics, 
to explore how the cultures of BOFIs impact on risk taking and control decisions.  This 
is beginning to change and advisory firms have created a number of service lines and 
survey instruments which seek to make risk culture visible and manageable.  Professional 
institutes have also developed guidance. Yet the subject remains an ‘elephant in the 
room’, of which many are aware, but few have the capacity to tackle to any degree of 
depth and clarity.      
In the wake of the global financial crisis, calls to address the culture of the banking sector 
have been accompanied by a distinct lack of detail on the specifics. For example, in 
October 2010, Marcus Agius, chairman of Barclays, stated:  
“…the leaders of industry must collectively procure a visible and substantive change in 
the culture of our institutions, so as fundamentally to convince the world once again that 
they are businesses which can be relied on.” (FT.com, 2010a)  
Similarly, in a series of speeches in 2010, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) indicated 
its commitment to improving the regulatory oversight of the culture of the UK financial 
services sector, and banking in particular (Sants, 2010a&b). This commitment was 
reiterated by Martin Wheatley in relation to the forthcoming Financial Conduct 
Authority (Wheatley, 2012). However, as the FSA Chairman Lord Turner has explained 
(FT.com, 2010b): “We simply do not know if we have the tools to change the banking 
culture.” 
Episodes such as the recent LIBOR scandal and apparent Payment Protection Insurance 
(PPI) mis-selling have reiterated the importance of culture and highlighted the very slow 
pace of change. Commenting in October 2012 Stephen Hester, the CEO of RBS stated, 
in an almost identical statement to Marcus Agius two years previously:   
“Banks must undergo a wholesale change in their culture and refocus their behaviour on 
meeting the needs of customers to restore trust in the industry.” (Reuters, 2012) 
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One particularly important aspect of this culture change and concomitant restoration of 
trust relates to the development of more appropriate risk cultures within banks and, for 
that matter, other financial institutions such as insurers, who are not immune to crises 
and scandals of their own (some insurers have been implicated as agents of PPI mis-
selling, for example). Influential organisations such as the Institute of International 
Finance (IIF) have even gone as far as to state that the: 
“…development of a ‘risk culture’ throughout the firm is perhaps the most fundamental 
tool for effective risk management.” (IIF 2008) 
Despite this apparent consensus on the importance of ‘risk culture’ (see also: Ashby, 
2011; Independent Audit, 2011), there is little agreement on what ‘risk culture’ is and 
how it might be managed.  We do not imagine that this situation is due to a lack of 
interest, especially amongst the consulting community.  Indeed, the internet is full of 
advice on how BOFIs can assess and manage their risk cultures and there are some 
interesting efforts to develop diagnostic tools (see Appendix I). Professional risk 
institutes are also contributing to the debate, e.g. the October 2012 launch of the 
Institute of Risk Management’s guidance on risk culture (IRM, 2012). 
A feature of much of the practice-orientated work is the assumption that risk cultures 
can and should be measured and categorised.  From this it seems to follow that there are 
some ideal elements of an effective risk culture, to which all organisations should strive 
(e.g. IIF, 2009). In short, we observe a desire to quantify risk culture, reducing it in some 
cases to a kind of basic personality profile which is then used to analysis the collective 
risk attitudes and risk management behaviours of an organisation’s decision makers. 
While we respect these efforts, we also feel that they necessarily overlook much of the 
richness of the concept of risk culture.  Not only is risk a multi-dimensional concept 
(Haimes, 2009) but, as with any kind of profiling, certain organisations will fit the 
simplified profiles that are provided, but many others will not. This issue is likely to be 
especially acute in the financial services sector, where there is a wide variety of 
organisations (large-small, domestic-international, proprietary-mutual, etc.) working in a 
range of markets (retail, commercial, investment, insurance, etc.). Equally, while the 
academic literature on culture is very large and has influenced some of the consulting 
products noted above, risk culture has largely been ignored (Bozeman & Kingsley, 1998, 
and Power, 2007: 175-8 are notable rarities).  
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Our approach, as academics to the already crowded discussion, is contained in this 
interim report on our project which we intend to complete in mid-2013.  It can be 
described as a 'bottom-up' approach which seeks in the first instance to understand how 
a sample of BOFIs think about and address risk culture, and especially how they make it 
actionable.  We elaborate on this approach in the next section and then offer our 
preliminary results and thinking. 
 
2. Risk Culture:  our approach  
There are many definitions of ‘risk culture’ (see Appendix I) and we do not wish to add 
to this list.  The different definitions have some common elements, namely a focus on 
the habits and routines which are relevant to risk taking and its mitigation. What makes 
risk culture such a fascinating and challenging topic to research is the fact that many, 
though not all, of these habits and routines are not readily visible, even to organisational 
participants themselves let alone researchers.  Yet it is this problem of visibility, of 
making risk culture visible, that is at the heart of current regulatory and organisational 
focus.   
It is a fact that the term ‘risk culture’ per se has gained increasing attention in the recent 
years. While the quotes in the previous section suggest anecdotal evidence of greater 
institutional attention, Figure 1 provides a more systematic analysis of the emergence of 
the term ‘risk culture’ using: a resource for access to global news in English (Nexis, 
including results related to the banking sector only); and the websites of 28 professional 
bodies and consultancy firms (practice search). 
Results confirm what we would naturally expect, namely an expansion in the use of the 
term in the last 10 years. 
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Figure 1 
 
At the outset, we should say that ‘risk culture in financial organisations’ is not a special 
and unique issue.  It may seem that way to those working in financial services, and there 
are certainly some unique features of financial services which we must take into account.  
But problems of 'risk culture' have many similarities with other change programmes 
which have been seen in corporate life, such as total quality management (TQM), 
Continuous Improvement programmes, and 'safety culture' in the offshore oil industry 
and in aviation. In all these cases, just as in the case of 'risk culture’ in financial 
organisations, the focus has come about as a consequence of disappointments with 
existing practice, of threats of competition, and of outright disasters. Furthermore, 'risk 
culture' itself is not a recent concept despite the attention it is now receiving. The term 
can be traced back to the 1980s and the Piper Alpha disaster, but scholars such as Barry 
Turner, author of Man-Made Disasters (1978), were exploring related issues before that.  
Accountants will trace contemporary concerns with risk culture back to the idea of the 
'control environment' which is at least as old as COSO (1992) and reaches even further 
back to auditors' distinction between transaction controls and general controls. 
This project intends to increase our understanding of ‘risk culture’ and effect a 
knowledge transfer from academia to business by focusing on the ‘drivers’ (e.g., attitudes 
to information complexity, rate of expansion in operations) which influence the risk 
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taking and control activities of BOFIs. The intention is not to presume what a ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ risk culture looks like but to investigate the often competing aspects of 
organisational culture which can drive both risk taking and its mitigation.  
We believe that a necessary step to achieve this goal is to start empirically by examining 
how organisations think about ‘risk culture’, what reasons lead them to an increased 
preoccupation with ‘risk culture’, and what are the concrete workstreams and change 
programmes put in place to make ‘risk culture’ a visible and manageable issue in the 
organisation. This mid-project report addresses mainly these latter issues – how 
organisations think and act on risk culture - based on our preliminary interview findings 
in nine BOFIs and additional interviews with relevant actors in the field (see Appendix II 
for more details on the methods). We do not impose on participant organisations our 
own definition and understanding of risk culture. On the contrary, we are primarily 
interested in how financial organisations define risk culture for themselves and develop 
actionable workstreams to manage it. 
If we have any prior assumptions, they are minimal and modest. They can be described 
as follows:  
• 'Risk culture' is not a static thing but a continuous process, or processes, which 
repeats and renews itself but may be subject to shocks.   
• Risk culture will be a mixture of formal and informal processes (as noted in 
recent IRM guidance).  The former are easy to observe; the latter are harder to 
observe since they involve a myriad of small behaviours and habits which in 
aggregate constitute the state of risk culture at any one point in time. 
• Finally, we do not assume that either an organisation has a single risk culture or 
that a risk culture may not be trans-organisational.  Conceptually we would prefer 
to speak of ‘risk cultures’ which may be unevenly distributed within organisations 
(e.g. retail as compared with investment banking) or the financial industry as a 
whole (e.g. insurers as compared with banks).   
These assumptions lead to an approach to risk culture that emphasises the notions of 
‘bandwidth’ and ‘limits’ (see Figure 2). Trade-offs between risk control and risk-taking 
activities are at the heart of our (tentative) conceptual model1. The basic and simple idea                                                         
1 Note that similar trade-offs can be traced in other literatures, such as management control (Simons, 1995) 
and safety culture (Reason, 1997). 
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is that both too much control and too little control can lead to mediocrity or lost 
opportunity (risk of bankruptcy) and catastrophe or value destruction respectively (risk 
of catastrophe). Reckless organisations operate beyond their authorised bandwidth limits, 
while precautionary organisations operate beyond their control propensity (i.e. the level 
of control hinders the achievement of business objectives).  The risk culture debate is 
primarily motivated by the former, whereas we think that it applies equally to the latter 
and the problem of excessive risk aversion.  
 
Figure 2: Tentative conceptual model of risk culture 
 
The model suggests that risk culture may be dependent on clarity about the 
desired/actual net risk position of an organisation. In the example in the figure, in both 
organisation A and organisation B there is a gap between the aspired and actual position 
in terms of risk control/risk taking. Importantly, we believe that what happens at both 
the aggregate organisational level and in specific settings matters.  Indeed, it may be more 
useful for practitioners to focus on the latter as ‘stress points’ in risk cultures (e.g. hiring 
and promotion; performance planning and rewards; relations with regulators; new 
product development), where conflicts and tensions arise, rather than imagine that risk 
cultures matter equally in all parts of the organisation. We also recognise that in some 
organisations there may be greater homogeneity between different organisational units (e.g. 
organisation A in the figure) than in others (e.g. organisation B). Specific areas and hot 
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spots may drive a business outside its prescribed ‘safe’ zone (e.g. unit B is leading 
organisation B towards the ‘total’ risk area). It follows from Figure 2 that risk culture 
requires clarity about, and commitment to the enforcement of, risk appetite or tolerance.    
To summarise, in a short period of time the discourse of risk culture has grown 
dramatically (Figure 1) and a number of advisory and policy initiatives have taken place 
or are underway (Appendix I). Our research seeks to make a further contribution to 
practitioner and academic understanding in this crowded space.  We begin in this interim 
report by addressing the way BOFIs think about risk culture. In future work we hope to 
identify organisational stress points where risk culture is both most visible and most 
tested.  
Our methodological approach is described in detail at Appendix II. We have conducted 
interviews with risk leaders in nine organisations to date, and have analysed the public 
disclosure documents of these firms. We have also surveyed some of the existing 
literature.  Our preliminary findings are based on our data collection to date and should 
be understood in the context of a small sample.  Future work will extend the database of 
the project to include surveys of professional body memberships and also key actors 
within some of our participating organisations.   
 
3. Risk Culture:  preliminary findings and ideas 
The initial interviews with senior risk leaders in participant organisations reveal an 
abundance of experimentation in the form of risk culture workstreams and change 
programmes. A number of interviewees agreed that risk culture is the most invisible and 
most important issue which fails to get enough attention in good times. Risk culture 
workstreams are often related to ambitions to change banking sector reputation. One 
interview complained about how one hears very often that banks have not changed their 
behaviours yet he has observed significant changes over the last three or four years. 
Our inquiries were at the level of senior personnel in the risk functions of the 
participating organisations. We felt that this was an important place to start but we 
recognise that it limits the extent to which we can draw any general conclusions. Bearing 
in mind these limitations, the following strands of results represent valuable input to 
develop further our understanding of risk culture. A number of common themes struck 
us in our enquiries. These are detailed in four separate sections, although the themes 
discussed in each section seem to be highly interdependent.  
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3.1. Information and organisational structure 
The failure to connect up disparate sources of risk information is a dominant diagnosis in 
the analysis of disasters and accidents (Turner, 1978), and we were struck by the 
centrality of this theme in many organisations.  This demonstrates that risk culture is 
seen not only or primarily as an ethical issue or as having to do with incentives.  Our data 
suggests that it also has as much, if not more, to do with management practice and 
information structures. 
Among our sample, there was an emphasis on risk centralisation coupled to enhanced 
oversight capability.  In one organisation this centralisation created ‘tighter control over 
big earners’ who were made to understand that their own rewards were dependent on the 
lower risk-return activities elsewhere in the group.  In this setting centralisation was also 
coupled to a programme to develop more of a group mentality at the level of the 
business. At a number of other organisations centralisation was closely linked to structural 
change in the form of new, small groups to oversee silos, support the board and provide 
risk oversight perceived as previously missing or inadequate. Such groups would be more 
forward looking and less granular in their operations as compared with, for example, 
daily liquidity or compliance regulation. Although these units were in their early days of 
operation and the process was not without friction, they were seen by their proponents 
as very important for risk culture. As one interviewee put it, the mistake of the regulator 
in the past was to focus too much on ‘risk management’ and not enough on ‘risk 
oversight’. 
We take the suggestion here to be that a form of risk oversight, which operates in a 
different way to both first and second line risk management, is a defining feature of 
improving consistency in risk management for these organisations. The setting of limits 
and boundaries via clear authorities for first line activity, and the monitoring of these 
limits, was a universal aspiration in all our organisations.  This suggests that the problem 
of risk culture may be as much about recovering clarity and enforcement capacity over 
organisational activities as it is about changing mindsets. Notably, we did not detect a 
romantic longing for a more solidaristic and communal organisation, something which is 
implicit in some consulting templates for risk culture. 
Another key aspect of the new emphasis on centralisation involves information. In part 
this is reflected in efforts to drive risk ownership into the front line of business even 
more than at present.  One organisation is explicitly building an approach where rewards 
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and promotional prospects are attached  to compliance across a range of activities.  Such 
an approach depends on finding metrics with desired behavioural impact.  
Understandably, organisations regard these metrics as proprietorial, but we noted a 
difference between those who were looking to develop the use of their existing suites of 
compliance and risk data for this purpose, and those using and adapting the tools 
suggested by external advisers.   
A closely related theme is the issue of the aggregation of risk data.  Problems with other 
financial organisations, such as UBS, revealed considerable informational fragmentation 
and a failure to consolidate risk information, even at the simple level of counting types of 
assets and commitments.  This was confirmed to us during an interview at the Bank of 
England.  This is both an information issue and an organisation issue; it was suggested 
that how often the quality of risk data aggregation is reviewed is a good 'dip-test' of the 
state of organisational risk culture. Monitoring and hygiene work of this kind is not 
glamorous but may be regarded as the foundation of organisational risk culture. One of 
our interviewees made a similar point in relation to keeping Business Continuity Plans 
(BCP) up to date.  More generally, the maintenance of risk infrastructure in the form of 
policies, standards and authorities was seen as essential.    
Finally, all organisations were concerned to break down silos and encourage risk 
information sharing.   In one organisation, this took the form of an open system with the 
idea of repositioning risk reporting and moving it away from the extreme of 
‘whistleblowing’ and transforming it into internal knowledge sharing via a data 
repository. This journey to openness would be achieved by organisation-wide training 
programmes. Interestingly, one organisation monitored the take-up of risk training 
courses by non-risk people within the organisation, regarding this as a measure of risk 
culture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1: Risk culture, information and structure 
The problem of risk culture may be as much about recovering clarity and 
enforcement capacity over organisational activities and information 
sharing as it is about changing mindsets. Risk information infrastructure, 
diffusion and use are a core feature of perceived ‘good’ risk culture by 
organisations.   
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3.2. Connecting first and second lines of defence 
From our initial interviews, we concluded that key issues are played out at the interface 
between what are called the first and second lines of defence. Several interviewees 
admitted that there were significant challenges in operationalising this interface.   
An ever present issue in maintaining risk culture is the structural position of risk 
functions within the organisation as a whole. One commonly identified issue was that of 
risk functions being captured by business units and this shows some of the difficulties of 
embedding risk directors within the front line.  Regulators also play a role in this issue by 
having concerns about lack of role clarity of embedded risk functions. As a result, there 
is a proliferation of what one interviewee called ‘dotted line reporting’ to cope with role 
dualities.  
A second issue, connected with the earlier discussion about information sharing and 
communication, concerns the reporting of risk issues by first line. A perceived challenge 
is to avoid punitive actions that may prevent managers from openly raising issues of 
concern. The potential problem emerges quite clearly from the words of one interviewee:  
 “One of the things that helps greatly with the flow of information through the 
organisation is how it’s reacted to when it gets to the next level. So being able to report 
risks openly and honestly without getting your head bitten off from the second that’s 
done  is crucial   […] For example, if I told you something that might be happening  you 
do not want your directors on your back saying ‘What have you told them? Why?’ So 
managing the flow of information through an organisation to ensure key stakeholders are 
properly engaged is quite important […] to avoid the wrong reaction happening.” 
Our preliminary view from these discussions is that role tensions and ambiguities of this 
kind are inherent in risk culture and organisations will deal with them in different ways.  
We had the impression that the distinction between first and second lines of defence was 
highly institutionalised in practitioner thinking but also unhelpful in addressing some of 
these more fuzzy issues. Rather than forcing key organisational actors into a binary 
system, the policy issue may be to have greater awareness and management of potential 
conflicts of interest and risks of capture. This seems more in line with the operating 
reality of organisations, particularly those with a large group structure.  
Indeed, two interviewees suggested that regulators operate with an old model of the 
CRO/CEO relationship, while their organisation had created a new oversight officer, in 
addition to a CRO in the traditional sense, to strengthen ‘risk oversight’ over ‘risk 
management’.  We are not yet in a position to judge the success of this innovation but it 
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raises an important question as to whether and how risk cultures would be judged by 
others, such as regulators, to be deficient if they adopt non-traditional roles and 
structure.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. The organisational footprint of the risk management function 
Risk functions have traditionally been less powerful in many financial organisations, 
partly for credibility reasons and partly because of benign economic conditions.  For 
example, despite longstanding efforts to launch ERM in insurers, underwriters and 
actuarial support have traditionally been at the centre of organisational risk thinking, with 
risk management confined to operations.   
This 'old' world has certainly been transformed, and was changing prior to the financial 
crisis. We learned of many different efforts to expand the footprint of risk management 
within organisations. An obvious first step in this respect has been to obtain membership 
in key committees. One interviewee noted that regrettably there had been no risk 
member in one key senior-level committee. This view was reinforced by another 
interviewee who noted that traditional committee structures tend to segment risk 
thinking whereas ‘good’ risk management is implicated in every committee and not just a 
‘risk’ committee: 
“You go to a management meeting and you talk about management issues and then you 
go to a risk committee and you talk about risk issues.  And sometimes you talk about the 
same issues in both but people get very confused and I don’t know … I don’t know how 
right it is but I really think you should be talking about risk when you talk about your 
management issues because it kind of feels to me again culturally that’s where we are.” 
Several interviewees acknowledged the communications challenge involved in increasing 
the footprint of risk management. In part this was ‘making sure that debates happen’ and 
being clear about the alignment of risk and performance. Risk functions which waste 
senior management time lose credibility very quickly.  As put by one interviewee: 
Box 2: Lines of defence and organisational innovations 
The present debate about risk culture appears to be characterised by 
efforts to strengthen roles that are already highly institutionalised and 
recognised by regulators. Therefore, the question is whether innovative 
organisational solutions, with a potential to enhance risk culture(s), may be 
welcomed or not by regulators and investors.   
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 “I have a two-hour slot with the Group Executive every month. I chose to cancel last 
month’s because I didn’t think I had enough of significance and urgency to utilise their 
time. It’s a two-way street, I get the time I ask for but you need to recognise that as much 
as I know I’ve got that slot, I’m not just going to come in and talk to you unless I’ve got 
material things to talk to you about. To keep their engagement and trust they need to 
know that I won’t unnecessarily waste their time.” 
At one organisation, we heard of efforts to animate risk conversations within the 
organisation using performance-focused language that did not use the ‘risk’ word.  
Similarly, one other recognised the need for the risk function to invest heavily in 
relationships with the front line and help them to take more responsibility. But it was not 
just a question of the front line. One CRO regarded IT and technology as one of the 
most challenging specialisms in the organisation with major challenges for the risk 
function. A number of organisations pointed to recruitment practices and pre-
employment screening as an essential pillar of building the ‘right’ kind of risk culture. 
Bearing in mind the limits of interviewing mainly senior risk managers, we were struck by 
two strands of our results.  First, risk culture at the organisation level was not articulated 
and discussed primarily in ethical and reputational terms about proper behaviour - it had 
a much more operational feel to it.  This is understandable as organisations have 
naturally responded to the risk culture challenge by dealing with what is visible and 
potentially manageable.  Second, ERM was conspicuous by its absence in our 
discussions. Indeed, only one interviewee mentioned explicitly their ERM process in 
relation to the risk culture discussion. This suggests that the relationship between risk 
culture workstreams and existing ERM systems may not be as straightforward as might 
be imagined.   We need to do further work on this issue, but it may be that ERM 
operates with traditional risk categories and business units; in contrast risk culture has 
more to do with linking formal and informal aspects of organisations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3: Risk culture and risk management 
Observed risk culture workstreams dealt primarily with what is visible and 
potentially manageable, while formal ERM systems were generally absent 
from risk culture discussions. Therefore, the relation between risk culture 
workstreams and existing ERM systems may not be as straightforward as 
might be imagined. 
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3.4. Documentation versus behavioural change 
Several interviewees noted that risk culture poses some unique problems of 
documentation. Indeed, this is hardly surprising given that it is both invisible and 
important as noted above.  In one organisation they were comfortable that the risk 
culture was good, but this was ‘hard to demonstrate’ especially for committees which 
tended to be highly ‘action- oriented’.  One CRO confirmed that the organisation was 
‘not good at writing things down and on process and formality.’ 
In another organisation, it was argued that Solvency 2 documentation requirements were 
substantively affecting underwriting decisions, i.e. making underwriters more risk-averse.  
From this point of view a big question in our study going forward is whether regulation 
is affecting risk cultures in unintended ways. Different attitudes towards regulators’ 
requests emerged from the initial interviewees. One interviewee put it rather bluntly: 
“It’s bureaucracy gone mad and is destroying the culture we have.  The pressure on 
individuals is phenomenal and has a negative impact on morale. They don't blame the 
company but just looking at what was being asked of them it was very clear it has limited 
real value to us or the regulator.”   
The CRO in another organisation, instead, suggested an ambition to align with 
regulators’ expectations. Paraphrasing the interviewee’s words, developing resistance is 
unlikely to be a fruitful strategy, although the business needs to recognise that 
compliance with regulatory requirements has a cost in terms of time and resources.   Yet 
another CRO said the financial regulator was a given and if one didn’t like it, then one 
should go to work in a different industry sector. 
Documentation issues were also important in the use of tools and surveys. A number of 
respondents said that they used staff surveys, both general satisfaction surveys and 
specific risk attitude surveys (this is not surprising considering the increasing availability 
of risk culture toolkits – see Appendix I). One said that such exercises could be fun, with 
feedback sessions being enjoyable. However, he also noted that generating clear and 
valuable actions from such exercises was difficult.   
We think that the potential value of such surveys might be in the process rather than the 
actionable outcome, since the academic literature suggests that increases in interaction 
may be associated with more effective risk cultures and capabilities to manage risk 
(Simons, 1999). However, this is just a speculation and an issue for further investigation.  
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4. What we hope to do 
The account given above describes our preliminary findings based on a small set of 
interviews with key organisational actors.  The conclusions and observations should be 
understood in the context of these limitations.  However, this early process has shaped 
where we will take the project in the next months and we welcome views on how we 
should do this.  Specifically we would like to look further into: 
• How are risk culture tools actually used?   There are a number of products in the 
consulting marketplace in addition to in-house change programmes. 
• What collaborative networks exist?  In the aviation industry we know that there is a 
lot of information sharing between engineers in different companies.  We might 
expect collaboration to exist for operational risk matters in the financial industry 
but market and credit risk issues would be likely to be highly proprietorial. 
• What are the effects of regulation on risk culture? Is regulation making organisations 
more risk averse and more averse to the risk of regulatory censure? Is it having 
further unintended consequences around how organisations manage their risks?  
For example, does regulation increase attention to risk measurability? 
• How do the first and second lines interact?  From the academic literature we know that 
interaction is an important feature of risk management, particularly under 
stressed conditions.  So a culture which encourages and sustains interaction could 
be said to be a good risk culture.  This might also help us to address the question 
of when is the embeddedness of risk management good or bad?  
• What are the pressure points in risk culture?  We intend that our survey instruments, 
follow-up focus groups and further interviews will provide some answers to this 
question. 
 
Box 4: ‘Writing things down’ 
Risk culture poses some unique problems of documentation, as 
organisations increasingly need to be good at ‘writing things down’. This 
poses a challenge in terms of maintaining a good relationship with 
regulators and making the best use of risk culture toolkits that stimulate 
valuable discussion and informal interaction.   
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Appendix I:  Selected ‘risk culture’ definitions and toolkits 
 
Table 1 below provides a range of selected definitions of risk culture from the practice 
and academic literature.  
 Selected definitions Source 
Pr
ac
tic
e 
lit
er
at
ur
e 
the combined set of individual and corporate values, attitudes, competencies 
and behaviour that determine a firm’s commitment to and style of 
operational risk management.   
Basel Committee 
(2011) 
…the general awareness, attitude and behaviour of its employees and 
appointed representatives to risk and the management of risk within the 
organisation. 
FSA (2006) 
 
…the norms and traditions of behavior of individuals and of groups within 
an organisation that determine the way in which they identify, understand, 
discuss, and act on the risks the organisation confronts and the risks it takes. 
IIF (2009) 
 
…the values, beliefs, knowledge and understanding about risk shared by a 
group of people with a common purpose, in particular the employees of an 
organisation or of teams or groups within an organisation. 
IRM (2012) 
 
…the system of values and behaviors present throughout an organisation 
that shape risk decisions. Risk culture influences the decisions of 
management and employees, even if they are not consciously weighing risks 
and benefits. 
KPMG (2010) 
 
...the norms of behaviour for individuals and groups within an organisation 
that determine the collective ability to identify, understand, openly discuss, 
and act on the organisation’s current and future risks. It is the last line of 
defence in grave situations. 
McKinsey (2010) 
 
…organisational behaviours and processes that enable the identification, 
assessment and management of risks relative to objectives ranging from 
compliance to operational, financial and strategic.  
PWC (2009) 
 
…the norms and traditions of behavior of individuals and groups within an 
organisation that determine the way in which they identify, understand, 
discuss and act on the risks the organisation confronts and takes.  
Towers Watson 
(2011) 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 li
te
ra
tu
re
 The organisation’s propensity to take risks as perceived by the managers in 
the organisation. 
Boseman and 
Kingsley 1998 
A risk culture is based on particular beliefs and assumptions. These can be 
clustered according to specific cultural tenets, namely risk, integrity, 
governance and leadership, decision-making, empowerment, teamwork, 
responsibility and adaptability… These tools are expressed in everyday 
workplace practices via attitudes and behaviours and, when they are 
expressed by leaders, they serve as powerful (human) culture embedding 
mechanisms. 
O’Donovan 
(2011) 
Table 1: Selected definitions 
 
Each of these definitions are different, but there is a common thread that runs through 
almost all of them (except IRM, 2012) – that risk culture relates to the behaviour of the 
people within an organisation in relation to risk management. Behaviour influences both 
the effectiveness of an organisation’s risk management processes and, as reflected in 
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some of these decisions, the nature of its risk taking and control decisions (e.g. IIF, 2009; 
KPMG 2010).  
Significantly, none of the above practitioner definitions reflect the culture-as-process 
orientation of Schein’s popular definition of organisational culture as: 
“…a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its problems of 
external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well enough to be 
considered valid and, therefore, taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, 
think and feel in relation to those problems.” (Schein, 2010: 18)   
Instead the practitioner definitions tend to explain risk culture by reference to discrete 
dimensions, through which the behaviours of decision makers are affected. It could be 
argued that this approach helps to simplify the concept of risk culture, making it more 
tractable for measurement and management. Not surprisingly, the measurement of risk 
culture is the focus of recent practice survey studies (see Table 2), and there are many 
guidance and toolkits to measure and manage the ‘risk culture’ of an organisation (see 
Table 3). 
 
Source Title 
Deloitte (2011) Global Financial Services Risk - Management Survey 
Deloitte (2011) Global risk management survey 
E&Y (2011) Making strides in financial services risk management 
EIU (2009) Beyond box-ticking - A new era for risk governance 
IRM (2011) Risk management embedding and risk culture - survey 
KPMG (2009) Never again? Risk management in banking beyond the credit crisis 
KPMG (2010) Risk Management - A Driver of Enterprise Value in the Emerging Environment 
Marsh (2012) Risk management benchmarking survey results 
Table 2: Selected surveys including questions on ‘risk culture’ 
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Source Title Notes 
Deloitte (2009) Solvency II and SST - Beyond quantitative models 
Road map for Solvency II, including a risk 
culture item 
Deloitte (2010) Insurance Learning-on-the-Go Risk and solvency assessment, including a risk culture framework 
Deloitte (2010) Remuneration policies in the financial sector Providing a risk culture framework 
Deloitte (2011) Human capital advisory services Toolkit to include risk culture in performance assessment and reward 
Deloitte (2011) Risk and Regulatory Review - The risk return proposition 
 Toolkit on “how to make a strong risk 
culture your competitive advantage” 
E&Y (2011) Growth in uncertain times - The need for dynamic risk management 
 5 steps to “understand and drive the right 
risk culture” 
IRM (2011) Risk guidance paper appetite & tolerance 
Risk culture diagnostic within risk appetite 
guidance document 
IRM (2012) Risk culture - Resources for Practitioners IRM risk culture framework 
KPMG (2008) Understanding and articulating risk appetite 
Framework on risk appetite including a risk 
culture item 
McKinsey 
(2010) 
Taking control of organizational 
culture 
Risk culture framework and risk culture 
diagnostic approach  
PWC (2007) The risk culture survey Risk diagnostic tool - Key attributes and key indicators of effective Risk management 
PWC (2011) Building effective risk cultures at financial institutions 
A framework where “risk culture forms one 
of the underlying foundations for managing 
risk” 
Table 3: Selected guidance/toolkits on ‘risk culture’ 
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Appendix II:  Methods 
We aim for collective knowledge production – working together with CROs and other 
relevant actors to arrive at a shared view of the cultural factors that drive risk taking and 
control within BOFIs. To this end, the research combines qualitative and survey 
methods. At the current stage, we explored the theme with initial interviews in nine 
organisations. These latter provide a breadth of perspective on the financial services 
sector, ranging from large providers of various types of financial services (e.g. insurance, 
investment and retail banking) operating on a global scale to much smaller organisations 
operating locally in the UK. A total of fifteen individuals have been interviewed, of 
which ten hold a senior position in the risk management area of the organisation (e.g. 
CRO or deputy CRO). Furthermore, we have enriched our understanding of the field 
with two additional interviews with relevant regulatory actors. 
We have also developed a short survey instrument to capture different aspects of risk-
taking and risk control activities, which would be administered within participant 
organisations by cooperating CROs. The main purpose will be to enable further 
discussion based on the survey’s results by means of feedback sessions and focus groups. 
An extended version of the survey has also been developed and will be administered 
within the membership of the Chartered Insurance Institute. This survey will enable us 
to obtain extensive data from across a significant sample of individuals working in the 
financial services sector. 
Overall, our research activities are informed by an (ongoing) review of the literature and 
desk research of pertinent publicly available documents  
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